# Synthèse : sources vérifiées Relevé le 28 septembre 2026, à la source primaire et non de mémoire : métadonnées déposées par l'éditeur (API Crossref, `api.crossref.org/works/`), pages et PDF d'arXiv, PDF des éditeurs en accès libre (Frontiers), versions des auteurs (consc.net, simulation-argument.com), dépôts institutionnels (LSE Research Online, Oxford Research Archive). Les sites d'OUP, Wiley, Springer, MDPI, AIP et PhilPapers refusent l'accès automatisé (403 ou défi JavaScript) ; pour ces articles, le texte vient de la version de l'auteur ou du dépôt institutionnel, et les métadonnées de Crossref. Pour chaque référence : citation complète, lien, passage vérifié (tel quel, en anglais), usage dans `texte_fr.md`, statut. Les pages sont celles du document consulté, précisé à chaque fois. ## Bilan des références demandées | Référence demandée | Statut | |---|---| | Chalmers, *Reality+* (2022) | vérifiée | | Chalmers, « The Matrix as Metaphysics » | vérifiée ; 2005 selon l'auteur, notice Crossref datée du 1ᵉʳ septembre 2004 | | Chalmers 1995 / 1996 (qualia évanescents) | vérifiées | | Searle 1980 (chambre chinoise) | vérifiée | | Mogensen, fin 2025, contre l'argument des qualia évanescents | **existe** : *Synthese* 206, 252, en ligne le 5 novembre 2025 ; vérifiée | | Lloyd, *Nature* 2000 ; *PRL* 2002 | vérifiées | | Vazza 2025 | vérifiée ; référence exacte : *Front. Phys.* 13, 1561873, 17 avril 2025 | | Commentaire « Edge et Brown » (2026) | **existe** : *Front. Phys.* 14, 1808725, 21 avril 2026 ; vérifié | | Bibeau-Delisle et Brassard, *Proc. R. Soc. A* 2021 | vérifiée | | Birch, *Erkenntnis* 2013 | vérifiée (en ligne 2012, numéro 78(1) de 2013) | | Bostrom, *Philosophical Quarterly* 2003 | vérifiée ; **titre corrigé** : la version publiée s'intitule « Are We Living in a Computer Simulation? » | | Hartle et Srednicki, « Are we typical? », *PRD* 2007 | vérifiée | | Kipping, *Universe* 2020 | vérifiée ; équations relevées dans la version arXiv, identique à la version publiée selon l'auteur | | Hensen et al., Giustina et al., Shalm et al. (2015) | vérifiées | | Zurek, *RMP* 2003 | vérifiée | | Jacques et al., *Science* 2007 ; « Ma et al. » | vérifiées ; pour « Ma et al. », retenu Ma, Kofler, Zeilinger, *RMP* 88, 015005 (2016) | | Barnes, *PASA* 2012 | vérifiée | | Beane, Davoudi, Savage 2012 | vérifiée (arXiv 2012, *EPJA* 50, 148, 2014) | Références ajoutées, parce que la vérification les rendait nécessaires : Bostrom 2005 (réponse à Weatherson), Bostrom et Kulczycki 2011, FAQ de Bostrom (2025), Weatherson 2003, Faizal et al. 2025, 't Hooft 2016, Vopson 2019, 2022, 2023 et 2025. Références retirées : **aucune**. Toutes les références demandées existent et disent ce que le texte leur attribue. ## Points relevés en vérifiant 1. **Bostrom 2003, note 10** (version de l'auteur, p. 6) : « 100 billion humans × 50 years/human × 30 million secs/year × [10^14, 10^17] operations in each human brain per second ≈ [10^33, 10^36] operations. » Le produit des facteurs vaut 1,5 × 10³⁴ à 1,5 × 10³⁷, quinze fois plus que la valeur imprimée (autotest de `analyse.py`, vérifié sur l'image de la page). Sans effet sur l'argument : Bostrom écrit (p. 6) que « even if our estimate is off by several orders of magnitude, this does not matter much for our argument ». Le texte retient le produit recalculé. La version publiée n'a pas pu être consultée (accès refusé). 2. **Bostrom 2003, titre** : Crossref, Wiley et OUP donnent « Are We Living in a Computer Simulation? » ; la version de l'auteur (simulation-argument.com) et sa FAQ disent « Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? ». 3. **Kipping 2020** : deux phrases de la version arXiv intervertissent « base » et « simulation ». Section 2.9 : « the probability that we live in a simulated reality radically shifts from just below one-half to just approaching zero » ; d'après l'équation (32) et le résumé, c'est la probabilité d'être dans la réalité de base qui tend vers zéro. Section 3 : « the probability we live in base reality […] is still not the favored outcome, with a probability less than 50% » ; d'après l'équation (22), c'est la probabilité d'être simulé qui est inférieure à 50 %. Les équations et le résumé sont cohérents entre eux. Par ailleurs, la seconde forme de l'équation (3) vaut n_G / N_sim et non n_G / (N_sim + 1) : écart relatif 1/(N_sim + 1), négligeable (autotest). 4. **Vazza 2025** : pour la Terre à pleine résolution, le tableau 1 donne une énergie minimale de 3,0 × 10⁵⁹ erg, l'équation (13) 2,55 × 10⁵⁹ erg. Écart interne sans effet sur ses conclusions ; le texte n'utilise pas ce nombre. 5. **Hensen et al. 2015** : le titre arXiv (« Experimental loophole-free violation of a Bell inequality using entangled electron spins separated by 1.3 km ») diffère du titre publié dans *Nature*, retenu dans le texte. 6. **Faizal et al. 2025** : le DOI annoncé (10.22128/jhap.2025.1024.1118) est inconnu de Crossref ; la référence est vérifiée par la notice arXiv (« Journal of Holography Applications in Physics 5 (2), 10-21 (2025) »). 7. **Vazza 2025, durée de calcul** (arXiv:2504.08461v1, p. 9, relu le 28 septembre 2026 à l'intégration au site) : « tCPU ∼ 4.2 · 10^13 s of computing time, i.e. ∼ 1.4 · 10^7 yr ». À 3,16 × 10⁷ s par an, 4,2 × 10¹³ s font environ 1,3 × 10⁶ ans, non 1,4 × 10⁷ ; le second cas de la même page (« tCPU ∼ 3.0 · 10^15 s », « ∼ 1 · 10^8 yr ») est cohérent. Écart de conversion sans effet sur sa conclusion (« requires geologically-long timescales », même page). La page du site ne reprend que la durée en secondes et cette qualification. ## Détail par référence ### 1. Chalmers, « The Matrix as Metaphysics » - D. J. Chalmers, dans C. Grau (dir.), *Philosophers Explore The Matrix*, Oxford University Press, p. 132-176. DOI 10.1093/oso/9780195181067.003.0009 (Crossref : chapitre de livre, pages 132-176, date 2004-09-01). Texte de l'auteur : https://consc.net/papers/matrix.html - En-tête de l'auteur : « This paper was originally written for the philosophy section of the official The Matrix website (2003) and was subsequently published in (Christopher Grau, ed.) Philosophers Explore the Matrix (Oxford University Press, 2005). » - Passages : « The Computational Hypothesis says: Microphysical processes throughout space-time are constituted by underlying computational processes. » ; « The Creation Hypothesis says: Physical space-time and its contents were created by beings outside physical space-time. » ; « The Mind-Body Hypothesis says: My mind is (and has always been) constituted by processes outside physical space-time, and receives its perceptual inputs from and sends its outputs to processes in physical space-time. » ; « Even if contemporary science tends to suggest that the hypothesis is false, we cannot rule it out conclusively. » ; « I think that even if I am in a matrix, my world is perfectly real. » ; « If so, the Matrix Hypothesis is not a skeptical hypothesis » ; « If it is true, there are still electrons and protons. On this picture, electrons and protons will be analogous to molecules: they are made up of something more basic, but they still exist. » ; « Most famously, Edward Fredkin has postulated that the universe is at bottom some sort of computer. More recently, Stephen Wolfram has taken up the idea in his book A New Kind of Science ». - Usage : section 1 (trois sens, réalité du monde simulé), section 3. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 2. Chalmers, *Reality+* - D. J. Chalmers, *Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy*, W. W. Norton (New York) et Allen Lane, 2022 ; ISBN 9780393635805 (relié). Page de l'auteur : https://consc.net/reality/ ; extrait (introduction et chapitre 1) : https://consc.net/reality+/excerpt.pdf - Page de l'auteur : « Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy was published by W. W. Norton (US) and Allen Lane (UK) on January 25, 2022. » ; « The central thesis of the book is virtual reality is genuine reality. » - Extrait, introduction : « The central thesis of this book is: Virtual reality is genuine reality. » ; « Virtual worlds are not illusions or fictions, or at least they need not be. » ; « Life in virtual worlds can be as good, in principle, as life outside virtual worlds. You can lead a fully meaningful life in a virtual world. » ; « The world we’re living in could be a virtual world. I’m not saying it is. But it’s a possibility we can’t rule out. » - Usage : sections 1 et 7. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 3. Bostrom 2003 - N. Bostrom, « Are We Living in a Computer Simulation? », *The Philosophical Quarterly* 53 (211), 243-255 (2003). DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00309 (Crossref : titre, revue, volume, numéro, pages). Version de l'auteur, « Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? », 14 pages : https://simulation-argument.com/simulation.pdf (pages ci-dessous : celles de cette version). - p. 2 : « Provided a system implements the right sort of computational structures and processes, it can be associated with conscious experiences. » ; « Arguments for this thesis have been given in the literature, and although it is not entirely uncontroversial, we shall here take it as a given. » - p. 5 : « The simulation may therefore need to include a continuous representation of computers down to the level of individual logic elements. » - p. 6 et note 10 : voir « Points relevés », n° 1. - p. 6-7 : notations f_P, N, H ; « f_sim = f_P N H / ((f_P N H) + H) » ; avec N = f_I N_I, « f_sim = f_P f_I N_I / ((f_P f_I N_I) + 1) (*) » ; « at least one of the following three propositions must be true: (1) f_P ≈ 0 (2) f_I ≈ 0 (3) f_sim ≈ 1 » ; p. 7-8 : « Cr(SIM | f_sim = x) = x (#) ». - p. 10 : « If the number of ancestor-simulations created by the interested civilizations is extremely large, the rarity of such civilizations must be correspondingly extreme. » - p. 11 : « an ethical prohibition against running ancestor-simulations because of the suffering that is inflicted on the inhabitants of the simulation ». - p. 12 : « If we do go on to create our own ancestor-simulations, this would be strong evidence against (1) and (2) » ; « Even if it is necessary for the hierarchy to bottom out at some stage – the metaphysical status of this claim is somewhat obscure – ». - p. 13 : « There would have to be about 100 billion times as many “me-simulations” (simulations of the life of only a single mind) as there are ancestor-simulations in order for most simulated persons to be in me-simulations. » ; « one can consider the following (farfetched) solution to the problem of evil: that there is no suffering in the world and all memories of suffering are illusions. » ; « the implications are not all that radical. Our best guide to how our posthuman creators have chosen to set up our world is the standard empirical study of the universe we see. » - p. 14 : « In the dark forest of our current ignorance, it seems sensible to apportion one’s credence roughly evenly between (1), (2), and (3). » - Usage : sections 1, 4, 5, 7, 8 ; formule (*) et répartition en trois parts dans `analyse.py`. - Statut : vérifiée ; titre corrigé ; écart de calcul relevé (note 10). ### 4. Bostrom 2005 (réponse à Weatherson) - N. Bostrom, « The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson », *The Philosophical Quarterly* 55 (218), 90-97 (2005). DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00387.x (Crossref). PDF : https://simulation-argument.com/weathersonreply.pdf - Passage (première page de l'article) : « My view is that we do not currently have strong evidence for or against any of the particular disjuncts. At any rate, the disjunction is all that the simulation argument purports to show; it does not seek to establish that we are probably living in a computer simulation. » - Usage : verdict, section 5. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 5. Bostrom et Kulczycki 2011 - N. Bostrom, M. Kulczycki, « A Patch for the Simulation Argument », *Analysis* 71 (1), 54-61 (2011). DOI 10.1093/analys/anq107 (Crossref). Version des auteurs : https://simulation-argument.com/patch.pdf - Résumé : « This article reports on a newly discovered bug in the original simulation argument. Two different ways of patching the argument are proposed, each of which preserves the original conclusion. » p. 2 : « This result would seem to suggest the possibility of the three propositions in the central tripartite disjunction of the simulation argument all being simultaneously false ». p. 3 : « the typical duration (or more precisely, the typical cumulative population) of the pre-posthuman phase does not differ by an astronomically large factor between civilizations that never run a significant number of ancestor simulations and those that eventually do. For example, in an appendix we show how by assuming that the difference is no greater than a factor of one million we can derive the key tripartite disjunction. » - Usage : section 5 (populations réelles). - Statut : vérifiée (ajoutée). ### 6. FAQ de Bostrom (2025) - N. Bostrom, « The Simulation Argument FAQ », « (2025) », « version 2.0 », https://simulation-argument.com/faq.html, consultée le 28 septembre 2026. - Question 2 : « I would assign a “substantial probability” to the simulation hypothesis. I tend to refrain from providing a specific number. (This is for various reasons, including that it could convey a false sense of precision.) » - Question 5 : « If the simulators don’t want us to know that we are simulated, they could easily prevent us from finding out. Consider that even our own humble brains—unaided by technology—usually manage to prevent us from realizing when we are dreaming at night, even though the typical dream is teeming with the most fantastic anomalies. » - Question 6 : « Critiques based on the assumption that a simulation would have to be fully comprehensive (e.g. Vazza (2025)) thus miss the point. » - Question 12 : « there is little reason to suppose that the hypothetical superintelligent simulators would use the crude simulation technique that such a test would detect. As the authors themselves note, modern lattice quantum dynamics simulations run by human physicists routinely use improved lattice techniques that remove this kind of artifacts. » - Question 17 : « No clarity is gained by asserting that the world isn’t “really real” if we are in a simulation. » - Usage : sections 1, 2, 4, 5, 6. - Statut : vérifiée (ajoutée). Document en ligne susceptible d'évoluer. ### 7. Weatherson 2003 - B. Weatherson, « Are You a Sim? », *The Philosophical Quarterly* 53 (212), 425-431 (2003). DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00323 (Crossref). Version de l'auteur : https://simulation-argument.com/weatherson.pdf - Résumé : « I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom’s argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false, on the third it does not entail the conclusion, and on the fourth it only entails the conclusion given an auxiliary hypothesis that we have no reason to believe. » - Usage : section 5 (règle de sélection). - Statut : vérifiée (ajoutée). ### 8. Hartle et Srednicki 2007 - J. B. Hartle, M. Srednicki, « Are we typical? », *Physical Review D* 75, 123523 (2007). DOI 10.1103/PhysRevD.75.123523 ; arXiv:0704.2630 (v3). - Résumé : « Some theoretical calculations make the selection fallacy that we are randomly chosen from a class of objects by some physical process, despite the absence of any evidence for such a process, or any observational evidence favoring our typicality. It is possible to favor theories in which we are typical by appropriately choosing their prior probabilities, but such assumptions should be made explicit to avoid confusion. » - Usage : section 5. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 9. Kipping 2020 - D. Kipping, « A Bayesian Approach to the Simulation Argument », *Universe* 6 (8), 109 (2020). DOI 10.3390/universe6080109 (Crossref). arXiv:2008.12254v1, commentaire de l'auteur : « Published in Universe. This version is formatted using the AAS 6.2 template ». Équations relevées dans le PDF et la source LaTeX de la version arXiv. - Résumé : « Using Bayesian model averaging, it is shown that the probability that we are sims is in fact less than 50%, tending towards that value in the limit of an infinite number of simulations. […] if humanity does start producing such simulations, then this would radically shift the odds and make it very probable that we are in fact sims. » - Équations (numérotation arXiv) : (1) N_sim = Σ_{g=2}^{G} p^{g−2} λ^{g−1} = (pλ − (pλ)^G)/(p − p²λ) ; (2) Pr(simulated | CES, H_S) = N_sim/(N_sim + 1) ; (3) Pr(g = G | CES, H_S) ; (7) Pr(nulliparous | H_S) ; (8) limite (λ − 1)/λ ; (12) facteur de Bayes (λ − 1)/λ ; (22) Pr(g = 1 | CES) = 1/2 + 1/(2(N_sim + 1)) ; (27) Pr(g = 1 | nulliparous) = 1/(2 − λ⁻¹) ; (32) Pr(g = 1 | parous) = λ/N_sim. Toutes reproduites et vérifiées dans `analyse.py` (autotests « kipping_* »). - Section 3 : « A standard choice is to assume all models are a-priori as likely as each other, but this could be challenged as being too generous to model H_S, on the basis that it is an intrinsically far more complex model. » - Affiliation (source LaTeX) : « Department of Astronomy, Columbia University ». - Usage : section 5, section 8 ; `analyse.py`. - Statut : vérifiée ; deux inversions de formulation relevées (voir « Points relevés », n° 3). ### 10. Bibeau-Delisle et Brassard 2021 - A. Bibeau-Delisle, G. Brassard, « Probability and consequences of living inside a computer simulation », *Proceedings of the Royal Society A* 477 (2247), 20200658 (2021). DOI 10.1098/rspa.2020.0658 (Crossref) ; arXiv:2008.09275v1. - Résumé : « It is shown that under reasonable assumptions a Drake-style equation can be obtained for the probability that our universe is the result of a deliberate simulation. Evaluating loose bounds for certain terms in the equation shows that the probability is unlikely to be as high as previously reported in the literature, especially in a scenario where the simulations are recursive. » - arXiv, p. 3, équation (4) : f_Sim = f_Civ f_Ded R_Cal / (1 + f_Civ f_Ded R_Cal) ; p. 4 : « In fact, fSim is only a baseline probability that needs to be adjusted according to Bayes’ inference rules in the light of other factors, which are virtually impossible to evaluate. » ; p. 9 : « fSim also is upper-bounded by fEff, which is most likely under 50% » ; « the situation is analogous to that of Drake’s equation [15], which contains too many hard-to-estimate factors ». - Usage : section 4. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 11. Birch 2013 - J. Birch, « On the ‘Simulation Argument’ and Selective Scepticism », *Erkenntnis* 78 (1), 95-107 (2013). DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9400-9 (Crossref). Résumé relevé sur LSE Research Online : https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/61813/ - Résumé : « I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for claims about the physical limits of computation and yet lack good evidence for claims about our own physical constitution. […] There is no good reason to uphold the selective scepticism the Simulation Argument presupposes. There is thus no good reason to believe its conclusion. » - Usage : section 4. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 12. Chalmers 1995 et 1996 - D. J. Chalmers, « Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia », dans T. Metzinger (dir.), *Conscious Experience*, Imprint Academic, 1995. Texte de l'auteur : https://consc.net/papers/qualia.html (en-tête : « Published in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger. Imprint Academic, 1995. »). - Passages : « given any system that has conscious experiences, then any system that has the same functional organization at a fine enough grain will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences » ; « To be sure, Fading Qualia may be logically possible. » ; « It follows that the possibility of Fading Qualia requires either a bizarre relationship between belief contents and physical states, or the possibility of beings that are massively mistaken about their own conscious experiences despite being fully rational. » ; à propos de Searle (1992) : « Here, Searle embraces the possibility of Fading Qualia ». - D. J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*, Oxford University Press, 1996 (« published with Oxford University Press in April 1996 », https://consc.net/books/tcm/). Précis de l'auteur (https://consc.net/papers/precis.html) : « Chapter 7: Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. I argue for a principle of organizational invariance […] ». Mogensen (2025) situe l'argument aux pages 253-263. - Usage : section 3. - Statut : vérifiées. ### 13. Searle 1980 - J. R. Searle, « Minds, brains, and programs », *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 3 (3), 417-424 (1980). DOI 10.1017/S0140525X00005756 (Crossref, résumé de l'éditeur). - Résumé : « (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. […] The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. […] (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. » - Usage : section 3. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 14. Mogensen 2025 - A. L. Mogensen, « How to resist the Fading Qualia Argument », *Synthese* 206 (5), 252 (2025). DOI 10.1007/s11229-025-05338-3 (Crossref : publié en ligne le 5 novembre 2025, licence CC BY 4.0). Texte : Oxford Research Archive, https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:12beef7f-6769-4066-ac01-84cb2a707535 (« Received: 30 July 2024 / Accepted: 18 October 2025 »). - Résumé : « The Fading Qualia Argument is perhaps the strongest argument supporting the view that in order for a system to be conscious, it does not need to be made of anything in particular […]. I show how the argument can be resisted given two key assumptions: that consciousness is associated with vagueness at its boundaries and that conscious neural activity has a particular kind of holistic structure. » - Conclusion (p. 15) : « I regard each of these assumptions as plausible, although both are obviously controversial. » ; « Nonetheless, I take myself to have exposed important weaknesses in the Fading Qualia Argument. » - Usage : section 3. - Statut : l'article existe ; vérifié. ### 15. Lloyd 2000 - S. Lloyd, « Ultimate physical limits to computation », *Nature* 406, 1047-1054 (2000). DOI 10.1038/35023282 (Crossref) ; arXiv:quant-ph/9908043v3. - arXiv : « quantitative bounds are put to the computational power of an ‘ultimate laptop’ with a mass of one kilogram confined to a volume of one liter » ; « the ultimate laptop can perform a maximimum of 5.4258 × 10^50 operations per second » ; « available memory space I = S/kB ln 2 = 2.13×10^31 bits ». - Usage : section 4 ; `analyse.py` (valeurs citées). - Statut : vérifiée. ### 16. Lloyd 2002 - S. Lloyd, « Computational Capacity of the Universe », *Physical Review Letters* 88, 237901 (2002). DOI 10.1103/PhysRevLett.88.237901 (Crossref) ; arXiv:quant-ph/0110141v1. - arXiv : « The universe can have performed no more than 10^120 ops on 10^90 bits. » ; « the total number of bits (≈10^90 in matter, ≈10^120 if gravitation is taken into account) and ops (≈10^120) » ; interprétations : « 2. They give lower bounds to the number of ops and bits required to simulate the entire universe on a quantum computer. 3. If one chooses to regard the universe as performing a computation, these numbers give the numbers of ops and bits in that computation. » - Usage : sections 1 et 4 ; `analyse.py`. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 17. Vazza 2025 - F. Vazza, « Astrophysical constraints on the simulation hypothesis for this Universe: why it is (nearly) impossible that we live in a simulation », *Frontiers in Physics* 13, 1561873 (publié le 17 avril 2025). DOI 10.3389/fphy.2025.1561873 (Crossref ; PDF de l'éditeur) ; arXiv:2504.08461. - Résumé : « In all cases, the amounts of energy or power required by any version of the simulation hypothesis are entirely incompatible with physics or (literally) astronomically large, even in the lowest resolution case. Only universes with very different physical properties can produce some version of this Universe as a simulation. […] It is simply impossible for this Universe to be simulated by a universe sharing the same properties, regardless of technological advancements in the far future. » - p. 2, tableau 1 (Univers à pleine résolution : 3,5 × 10¹²⁴ bits, 8,9 × 10¹⁰⁸ erg) ; p. 3, équation (8) : E_U ∼ 2,7 × 10⁷⁸ erg ; p. 4 : « the initialization of a complete simulation of “just” a planet like Earth requires either converting the entire stellar mass of a typical globular cluster into energy or […] » ; p. 5 : λ_ν ∼ 1,2 × 10⁻²¹ cm, I_⊕,low ≈ 1,65 × 10⁵¹ bits ; p. 6 : « tCPU ∼ 4.2 · 10^13 s of computing time, that is, ∼ 1.4 · 10^7 yr, using the computing power given by Equation 20 » ; p. 7-8 (section 4.4) : « it is implausible that the information budget quoted in this work can be reduced by several orders of magnitude » ; p. 10 : « the question of whether universes with entirely different sets of physical laws or dimensionalities could produce our Universe as a simulation seems to be entirely outside of what is scientifically testable, even in theory » ; « a possible “simulation hypothesis,” which does not pose obvious constraints on computing, might be the solipsistic scenario » ; « nothing is new from Renee Descartes’ “evil genius” […] to “Boltzmann brains” ». - Usage : sections 2, 4, 7, 8. - Statut : vérifiée ; écart interne relevé (« Points relevés », n° 4). ### 18. Edge et Brown 2026 - E. Edge, C. A. Brown, « Commentary: Astrophysical constraints on the simulation hypothesis for this Universe: why it is (nearly) impossible that we live in a simulation », *Frontiers in Physics* 14, 1808725 (publié le 21 avril 2026). DOI 10.3389/fphy.2026.1808725 (Crossref ; PDF de l'éditeur, « TYPE General Commentary »). - p. 2 : « Vazza’s strongest conclusions follow for a shared-world, planet-level (and experiment-consistent) simulation under physics like our own, but that scope is broader than the minimal rendering commitments Bostrom outlines for sustaining verisimilitude in subjective experience » ; p. 2 : « This commentary does not propose a new variant of the SH, nor does it evaluate the probability of its truth ». - Usage : sections 4 et 8. - Statut : le commentaire existe ; vérifié. ### 19. Faizal, Krauss, Shabir, Marino 2025 - M. Faizal, L. M. Krauss, A. Shabir, F. Marino, « Consequences of Undecidability in Physics on the Theory of Everything », *Journal of Holography Applications in Physics* 5 (2), 10-21 (2025) (référence donnée par la notice arXiv) ; arXiv:2507.22950v1. - Résumé : « Because any putative simulation of the universe would itself be algorithmic, this framework also implies that the universe cannot be a simulation. » p. 8 : « These proposals assume that every physical truth is reducible to the output of a finite algorithm executed on a sufficiently powerful substrate. » ; « Since it is impossible to simulate a complete and consistent universe, our universe is definitely not a simulation. As the universe is produced by MToE, the simulation hypothesis is logically impossible rather than merely implausible. » - Usage : section 4 (et verdict). - Statut : vérifiée par arXiv (ajoutée) ; DOI absent de Crossref. ### 20. 't Hooft 2016 - G. 't Hooft, *The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics*, Springer (Fundamental Theories of Physics), 2016. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41285-6 (Crossref) ; arXiv:1405.1548v3. - Résumé arXiv : « we argue that even the Standard Model, together with gravitational interactions, might be viewed as a quantum mechanical approach to analyse a system that could be classical at its core. We explain how such thoughts can conceivably be reconciled with Bell's theorem, and how the usual objections voiced against the notion of ‘superdeterminism’ can be overcome, at least in principle. » - Usage : sections 1 et 6. - Statut : vérifiée (ajoutée). ### 21-23. Tests de Bell sans échappatoire (2015) - B. Hensen et al., « Loophole-free Bell inequality violation using electron spins separated by 1.3 kilometres », *Nature* 526, 682-686 (2015). DOI 10.1038/nature15759 (Crossref, 19 auteurs) ; arXiv:1508.05949v1. Résumé arXiv : « We perform 245 trials testing the CHSH-Bell inequality S ≤ 2 and find S = 2.42 ± 0.20. A null hypothesis test yields a probability of p = 0.039 that a local-realist model for space-like separated sites produces data with a violation at least as large as observed ». arXiv p. 7 : « Strictly speaking, no Bell experiment can exclude the infinite number of conceivable local realist theories, because it is fundamentally impossible to prove when and where free random input bits and output values came into existence. » - M. Giustina et al., « Significant-Loophole-Free Test of Bell’s Theorem with Entangled Photons », *Physical Review Letters* 115, 250401 (2015). DOI 10.1103/PhysRevLett.115.250401 (Crossref) ; arXiv:1511.03190. Résumé : « The purely statistical probability of our results to occur under local realism does not exceed 3.74 × 10^-31, corresponding to an 11.5 standard deviation effect. » - L. K. Shalm et al., « Strong Loophole-Free Test of Local Realism », *Physical Review Letters* 115, 250402 (2015). DOI 10.1103/PhysRevLett.115.250402 (Crossref) ; arXiv:1511.03189. Résumé : « we compute p-values as small as 5.9 × 10^-9 for our Bell violation while maintaining the spacelike separation of our events. […] our smallest adjusted p-value is 2.3 × 10^-7. We therefore reject the hypothesis that local realism governs our experiment. » - Usage : section 6. - Statut : vérifiées. ### 24. Zurek 2003 - W. H. Zurek, « Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum origins of the classical », *Reviews of Modern Physics* 75, 715-775 (2003). DOI 10.1103/RevModPhys.75.715 (Crossref) ; arXiv:quant-ph/0105127v3 (« the text is identical with that in the Rev. Mod. Phys. July issue »). - Résumé : « Decoherence is caused by the interaction with the environment. Environment monitors certain observables of the system, destroying interference between the pointer states corresponding to their eigenvalues. » ; texte : « Von Neumann (1932), London and Bauer (1939) and Wigner (1963) have all appealed to the special role of the conscious observer. […] Quantum formalism has led us to a different view » ; « decoherence – through einselection – helps solve the measurement problem ». - Usage : section 6. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 25. Jacques et al. 2007 - V. Jacques, E. Wu, F. Grosshans, F. Treussart, P. Grangier, A. Aspect, J.-F. Roch, « Experimental Realization of Wheeler’s Delayed-Choice Gedanken Experiment », *Science* 315, 966-968 (2007). DOI 10.1126/science.1136303 (Crossref) ; arXiv:quant-ph/0610241. - Résumé arXiv : « The choice between measuring either the ‘open’ or ‘closed’ configuration is made by a quantum random number generator, and is space-like separated -- in the relativistic sense -- from the entering of the photon into the interferometer. Measurements in the closed configuration show interference with a visibility of 94%, while measurements in the open configuration allow us to determine the followed path with an error probability lower than 1%. » ; texte : « Once more, we find that Nature behaves in agreement with the predictions of Quantum Mechanics even in surprising situations where a tension with Relativity seems to appear. » - Usage : section 6. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 26. Ma, Kofler, Zeilinger 2016 - X.-S. Ma, J. Kofler, A. Zeilinger, « Delayed-choice gedanken experiments and their realizations », *Reviews of Modern Physics* 88, 015005 (2016). DOI 10.1103/RevModPhys.88.015005 (Crossref) ; arXiv:1407.2930v3. - Conclusion (arXiv) : « It is a general feature of delayed-choice experiments that quantum effects can mimic an influence of future actions on past events. However, there never emerges any paradox if the quantum state is viewed only as ‘catalogue of our knowledge’ […] no physical interactions or signals, let alone into the past, are necessary to explain the experimental results. » - Usage : section 6. - Statut : vérifiée (choix pour « Ma et al. »). ### 27. Barnes 2012 - L. A. Barnes, « The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life », *Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia* 29 (4), 529-564 (2012). DOI 10.1071/AS12015 (Crossref, résumé de l'éditeur) ; arXiv:1112.4647. - Résumé : « The claim is that in the space of possible physical laws, parameters and initial conditions, the set that permits the evolution of intelligent life is very small. […] I do not attempt to defend any conclusion based on the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life. » - Usage : section 6. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 28-30. Vopson - M. M. Vopson, « The second law of infodynamics and its implications for the simulated universe hypothesis », *AIP Advances* 13, 105308 (2023). DOI 10.1063/5.0173278 (Crossref, résumé de l'éditeur) : « Despite the lack of evidence, this idea is gaining traction in scientific circles […] we provide scientific evidence that appears to underpin the simulated universe hypothesis. » - M. M. Vopson, « Is gravity evidence of a computational universe? », *AIP Advances* 15, 045035 (2025). DOI 10.1063/5.0264945 (Crossref) : « This is another example of data compression and computational optimization in our universe, which supports the possibility of a simulated or computational universe. […] This is fully aligned with Verlinde’s entropic gravity studies published in 2011 ». - M. M. Vopson, S. Lepadatu, « Second law of information dynamics », *AIP Advances* 12, 075310 (2022). DOI 10.1063/5.0100358 (Crossref) : « the second law of infodynamics requires the information entropy to remain constant or to decrease over time ». - M. M. Vopson, « The mass-energy-information equivalence principle », *AIP Advances* 9, 095206 (2019), DOI 10.1063/1.5123794 ; M. M. Vopson, « Experimental protocol for testing the mass–energy–information equivalence principle », *AIP Advances* 12, 035311 (2022), DOI 10.1063/5.0087175 (Crossref : titres, auteur, dates). - Le texte intégral n'a pas pu être consulté (AIP refuse l'accès automatisé) : le texte ne s'appuie que sur les résumés et les métadonnées de l'éditeur. - Usage : section 6. - Statut : vérifiées (ajoutées). ### 31. Beane, Davoudi, Savage - S. R. Beane, Z. Davoudi, M. J. Savage, « Constraints on the Universe as a Numerical Simulation », *European Physical Journal A* 50, 148 (2014). DOI 10.1140/epja/i2014-14148-0 (Crossref) ; arXiv:1210.1847 (4 octobre 2012). - Résumé : « we assume that our universe is an early numerical simulation with unimproved Wilson fermion discretization […] the most stringent bound on the inverse lattice spacing of the universe, b^(-1) >~ 10^(11) GeV, is derived from the high-energy cut off of the cosmic ray spectrum. The numerical simulation scenario could reveal itself in the distributions of the highest energy cosmic rays exhibiting a degree of rotational symmetry breaking that reflects the structure of the underlying lattice. » ; conclusion (arXiv) : « Given the ease with which current lattice QCD simulations incorporate improvement or employ discretizations that preserve chiral symmetry, it seems unlikely that any but the very earliest universe simulations would be unimproved with respect to the lattice spacing. Of course, improvement in this context masks much of our ability to probe the possibility that our universe is a simulation ». - Usage : section 6. - Statut : vérifiée. ### 32. Tests n° 1 à 4 d'aeternam - Valeurs recopiées par `analyse.py` depuis `recherche/2026-09-28-grille-lhaaso/`, `recherche/2026-09-28-rayons-cosmiques/` et `recherche/2026-09-28-dispersion-directionnelle/` (`resultats.json`), avec leur empreinte SHA-256 enregistrée dans `resultats.json` (clé `tests`). - Lues directement dans leur `resultats.json` par `site/generer.py` (`table_synthese`) : le nombre de bits bruts du test n° 4 (`recherche/2026-09-28-hasard-quantique/`, `volume.bits_bruts_non_haches`) et l'excès non exclu du test n° 2, pris comme dans son article à la pire des orientations fixées (`limite_superieure_95.pire_orientation_epsilon_axes_max`). La valeur `tests.test2.exces_axes_non_exclu_95` de `resultats.json` est la limite moyenne sur les orientations, que l'article du test n° 2 ne retient pas. ### 33. Musk, Code Conference 2016 - E. Musk, entretien à la Code Conference 2016 ; vidéo : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KK_kzrJPS8. - Motherboard (Vice), 2 juin 2016, https://www.vice.com/en/article/elon-musk-simulated-universe-hypothesis/ : « 40 years ago, we had pong, two rectangles and a dot […] Now 40 years later we have photorealistic 3D simulations with millions of people playing simultaneously and it’s getting better every year. And soon we’ll have virtual reality, augmented reality, if you assume any rate of improvement at all, the games will become indistinguishable from reality. » ; « we will create simulations that are indistinguishable from reality or civilization will cease to exist. Those are the two options. » - TechCrunch, 24 juin 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/24/a-running-tab-of-what-tech-people-think-about-whether-were-living-in-a-simulation : « there would probably be billions of such computers and set-top boxes, it would seem to follow that the odds that we’re in base reality is one in billions. » - Usage : accueil (bloc « La théorie ») et section 5 : borne haute de \(N_I\) (10^9) dans notre choix central. - Statut : vérifiée (passages relus le 28 septembre 2026 dans les deux articles).